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analyze the dynamic effects of licensing on R&D competition in the innovation market
and to examine the rationale for often observed grant-back clauses.  Of particular concern
are how the consideration of future competition distorts the licensing relationship and
how the "grant-back" clause can mitigate this distortion.   I also evaluate the validity of
the casual antitrust argument that grant-back clauses may adversely affect competition
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I. Introduction
Licensing is a voluntary form of dissemination whereby an inventor can enjoy at
least some of the gains to trade by availing other parties of the use of his superior
knowledge (see Kamien [1992] for an excellent survey on licensing).  Firms often grant
licenses because they do not have the resources to achieve full commercial exploitation of
their intellectual property by themselves. The inventor, for instance, may lack
complementary assets to fully appropriate the potential of the technology (Teece, 1986)
and/or may have insufficient financial resources to serve all geographic markets.  In this
case, licensing, by leveraging on other firms’ resources, can serve as a device to broaden
geographic and product markets.
 Granting a license, however, also poses substantial risks for the inventor such as
the risk of piracy, the loss of control over exploitation of the technology, and the
dependence on others for revenue (Dratler, 1994).   Moreover, licensing creates
competition by giving away proprietary know-how to potential rival firms.  One of the
major risks involved with creating a competitor is that the licensing firm may lose its
technological “edge” by setting up its future competitor in innovation markets.  In
particular, granting others the right to use its intellectual property may enable them to
develop new products, which make the licensed technology obsolete and leave the
licensor in backwater of technology – the so-called “Boomerang” effect.1
In this context, it is not surprising to witness empirical evidence that firms are
often reluctant to license their cutting-edge technologies since they may be giving their
rivals the knowledge necessary to develop a better technology [Roberts and Mizouchi
                                                          
1For instance, it has often been suggested that myopic U.S. firms sold their future by licensing the state-of-
the-art technologies for short-term profits.  As a result, they lost ground to their competitors in the
succeeding generation of technological development.  The videocassette recorder (VCR) and the
semiconductor are two prominent examples.  In the case of VCR, Ampex Corporation was the first company
that introduced commercially viable videotape recorder (VTR) in 1956.  Ampex, not overly concerned
about the competitive implications of transferring the technology, widely licensed its patented technology.
As a result, Sony was the first company to mass-market home VCRs.  By the mid-1980s, the consumer
market was dominated by the Japanese (see Yoffie, 1990).4
(1988) and Davies (1977)].2  As a response to this problem, it has also been suggested
that a "technology flowback" provision in the contract that requires the licensee to share
any advances or improvements in the licensed technology with the licensor, might remedy
the licensor's problem of losing competitive advantage to the licensee in product
development (see Shapiro (1985) and Rothstein and Willgohs [1988]).  In fact, Caves et
al. (1983) report that 43 percent of licensing agreements contain such grant-back clauses.
Despite these concerns, the formal analysis of the effect of the licensing on future
R&D competition has been relatively sparse.   Most of the licensing literature, in contrast,
is concerned with the impact of licensing on the competition in the current product
market [Katz and Shapiro (1985) and Kamien (1992)].   In this paper, I analyze the
dynamic effects of licensing on the competitiveness of the licensor in the innovation
market and examine the rationale for often observed grant-back clauses.  Of particular
concern are how the consideration of future competition distorts the licensing relationship
and how the "grant-back" clause can mitigate this distortion.  In the process, I also
evaluate the validity of the casual antitrust argument that grantback clauses may adversely
affect competition because they reduce the licensee’s incentive to engage in R&D and
thereby limit rivalry in innovation markets.
The basic premise of the paper is that the market for information is replete with
imperfection and this is reflected in the incompleteness of licensing agreements.3  In
particular, the nature of knowledge to be transferred is not well-defined in that it cannot
be specified exactly in the contract; the technology concerned contains a highly tacit
component which is informal and less codified than usually assumed in the licensing
literature.4  Which type of technology is transferred may be observable to the parties in
                                                          
2According to Roberts and Mizouchi (1988), “[F]irms need to be aware with regards to licensing that the
technology obtainable through these arrangements might not be state of the art.”  They quote one senior
manager of Genetics Institute saying that the technology they license to outsiders is not the most advanced
one.  Davies (1977) also documents that British “companies with radically new products were concerned
not to disclose them in the Indian market, preferring to license earlier generations of expertise.”
3 See Grossman and Hart (1986) for a seminal analysis using the incomplete contract framework.
4Berrill (1964) points out that "only the broad outlines of technical knowledge are codified by non-personal
means of intellectual communication".5
the relationship but not verifiable to a third party.  Henceforth, it may not be enforceable
in court.  I assume that the contract can specify the lump-sum payment and/or royalty fee
which depends on the verifiable quantity produced by using the technology licensed, and
may specify the allocation of property rights on any forthcoming improvement based on
the licensed technology.  In this case, there may be conflicts in the type of technology that
is actually delivered and the one that is desired to be delivered unless the contract is
designed to be incentive-compatible.  This implies that the process of technology transfer
is susceptible to the moral hazard problem.  The terms of technology licenses should
reflect this imperfection of the license market [Caves et al. (1983)].  The incomplete
contract approach in this paper thus provides one explanation why, in practice, licensing
contracts are predominantly royalty-based5; quantity-dependent royalty payments provide
the only connection between successful transfer and the returns accruing to the licensor
[Davies (1977)].
Incorporating the element of moral hazard in the technology transfer process will
be shown to shed some light on issues that cannot be handled in more conventional
models of licensing.  For instance, I argue that the possibility of leapfrogging by the
potential licensee in and of itself cannot be the reason for withholding the frontier
technologies.  The reason is that if this possibility is foreseen by the parties concerned, the
licensor can be potentially compensated for any future loss of competitiveness due to the
technology transfer.  Therefore, the current theory, if there is one, is deficient for it fails to
reveal the logical steps that carry it from the possibility of leapfrogging by the licensee to
the reluctance of the licensor to transfer the cutting-edge technologies.
To make my point, I first demonstrate that if a complete contract can be written,
the best available technology will always be licensed only with a lump-sum payment,
simply because it enables the licensee to produce more efficiently; the first-best outcome
                                                          
5According to Rostoker (1984),  licensing with fixed fee alone  was used only 13 percent of the time.  In
contrast, royalty plus fixed fee licensing was used 46 percent of time and royalty alone was used 39 percent
of time.  In a study on international technology licensing, Contractor (1981) also concludes that “no all-
encompassing generalization can be made beyond the apparent ubiquity of royalties as a mode of payment.”6
is achieved and grant-back clauses are not necessary.   This leads me to conclude that the
real reason for the failure of licensing originates from the inability of the parties to the
licensing relationship to write a complete contract.   Without a commitment mechanism
for the licensor, the contract should be incentive compatible for the best technology to be
transferred in order to prevent ex post opportunism.   It will be shown that a quantity-
dependent royalty payment can serve as a hostage to facilitate the transfer of the best
technology.  The inclusion of the royalty rate introduces an artificial cost for the licensee
and entails allocative inefficiency.  If this cost of the incentive compatibility constraint
(ICC) is too high, the best technology will not be transferred.  Thus, the incomplete
contract approach in this paper will make explicit the mechanism by which the transfer of
cutting-edge technology is hindered.6  Then, I demonstrate how the grant-back clause can
relax the incentive compatibility constraint and facilitate the transfer of the best
technology available.
As pointed out earlier, the effect of licensing on competition in the innovation
market has not received sufficient attention in the formal analysis.  The main reason for
the scarcity of the dynamic analysis of licensing lies in the typical assumption in the
literature that the firm’s current technological capability has no bearing on its capability
to innovate.  Thus, every firm is equally capable to develop new products and competes
on a level playing field in the innovation market.7   One consequence of this assumption
is Arrow’s (1962) celebrated “replacement effect” which induces an incumbent to have
less chance to innovate than potential entrants as the incumbent rests on his laurels.8  This
assumption is also responsible for Gallini’s (1984) “deterrence by market sharing” result
                                                          
6In a companion paper (Choi, 1995), I also apply the incomplete contract framework to a situation in which
effective transmission of knowledge requires costly inputs which cannot be contracted directly.  It is shown
that the introduction of inputs that are not contractible and costly explains the prevalence of royalty
contracts in the licensing relationship.  Moreover the model relates the size of the royalty rate to the
parameters that represent the circumstances under which the concerned parties operate.
7For instance, Gallini and Winter (1985) assume that research outcomes yield random production costs
whose distribution is independent of the current costs (italics added).
8See also Reinganum (1985) for an industry evolution model of patent race in which the replacement effect
is responsible for the Schumpeterian process of creative destruction.7
in which the incumbent shares the current market by licensing to a rival firm in order to
reduce the rival firm’s incentive to innovate.9  In reality, however, the innovation process
is cumulative and licensing of a new technology serves as a stepping stone for further
developments of the licensed technology [Scotchmer (1991) and Green and Scotchmer
(1995)].  Unless the knowledge spillover from the technology holder is complete and
costless,  licensing will facilitate the development of new products and the licensor runs
the risk of being preempted by the licensee in the innovation market.  This paper, in
contrast, incorporates the cumulative nature of innovation and provides a framework to
analyze dynamic issues associated with licensing.10
It should be mentioned that a small number of papers analyze the impact of
licensing on R&D incentives.   Most notable are a series of papers by Scotchmer (1991,
1996, 1999) who develops models in which licensing is required to continue to the next
stage.  In her models, licensing is necessary not because of the information it imparts, but
because the original patent is sufficiently broad to be “blocking.”  My paper expands on
this theme by recognizing that licensing may increase a licensee’s ability to engage in
successful research, and thus be viewed as complementary to Scotchmer’s analysis.11
Grossman and Shapiro (1986) and Fershtman and Kamien (1992) analyze the condition
under which the licensing of the intermediate result can be jointly attractive in a multi-
stage R&D game and how the possibility of licensing influences the pace of innovation.
However, these papers consider a case where the object of licensing is an intermediate
result which is of no value in itself and thus, is devoid of any interaction between the
current product market competition and the future R&D competition.
In analyzing the quality of the licensed technology, this paper is closely related to
Rockett (1990).  Her model allows the licensor to choose which versions of the
                                                          
9This type of strategic licensing is called ex ante licensing in Gallini and Winter (1985) to contrast from the
licensing for the purpose of enhancing the production technology after the realization of R&D which is
called ex post licensing.
10Katz and Shapiro (1987) analyze the possibility of post-development licensing on R&D competition.  In
contrast, this paper is interested in the effect of pre-development licensing on R&D competition.
11 See also Green and Scotchmer (1995) and O’Donoghue, Scotchmer and Thisse (1998).8
technology to license when the licensor and the licensee are duopolists competing in the
same product market.  My paper, in contrast, concerns with the effects of licensing on
competition in the innovation market. The analysis of innovation market competition
differs from competition in the product market due to the additional effects of the quality
of licensed technology on future product development.  In Rockett (1990), different
versions of the technology are fully characterized by their corresponding marginal costs.
Therefore, the effects of the quality of licensed technology and the grant-back clause on
future product development are not considered.
The remainder of the paper is organized in the following way.  In section II, I set
up a basic model to analyze the dynamic consequences of licensing and provide a
rationale for the inclusion of the so-called grant-back clause.  Section III concerns the
effect of the grantback clause on the R&D incentives.  In particular, I examine the validity
of the concern that the inclusion of the grantback clause has anti-competitive effects in
reducing the rivalry in the R&D market.  Section IV analyzes the optimal licensing
contract in the presence of R&D competition.  Section V discusses the results of the
model in relation to the policy statements in the recent Antitrust Guidelines for the
Licensing of Intellectual Property (1995).  Section VI contains concluding remarks.
II. The Basic Model: An Incomplete Contract Approach to Technology Transfer
I consider a technology transfer between two firms which operate in two different
markets.12   I assume that these two markets are segmented.  Thus, there is no direct
competition between the licensor and the licensee in the same market.  For instance, these
two firms may be located in two different countries and due to the required “localization”
of the product either to comply with local regulations or to satisfy local customers and
                                                          
12I assume that the technology is licensed to only one firm in a given market. This assumption is in accord
with Firestone's (1971) finding that most licenses are sold to a single firm. This is also consistent with the
empirical evidence of costly technology transfer, which can be regarded as a fixed cost of production.   For
instance, in  Teece’s (1977) study on 26 international technology projects, the transfer costs ranged from
2% to 59% of total project cost.  See Choi (1995) for an analysis of costly technology transfer in the
presence of double moral hazard.9
tastes, licensing may be a better option to serve a foreign market.  Alternatively, these two
firms may be in different industries serving different customer bases even though they are
related in that one firm’s basic technology can be used by the other firms as well.  This
assumption spares an analysis of the competitive effect of licensing on the product
market.13  Licensing, however, may give the licensee the knowledge necessary to develop
a better technology and may create competition in the innovation market.  Both parties are
assumed to be risk-neutral and have reservation utility of zero.  There are many potential
licensees.  As a result, the licensor has the bargaining power and makes a take-it-or-leave-
it offer to the licensee.  The distribution of the bargaining power has no consequences for
efficiency in my framework since I do not assume any cash constraint for either party.14
I first argue that the possibility of leapfrogging by the potential licensee in and of
itself cannot be the reason for the licensor’s reluctance to transfer the cutting-edge
technologies.  If the possibility of leapfrogging is foreseen by the parties concerned, the
licensor can be potentially compensated for any future loss of competitiveness due to the
technology transfer.  To make my point, I demonstrate that if a complete contract can be
written, the best available technology will always be licensed simply because the first-
best outcome requires production efficiency [Coase, 1960].  Thus, the real reason for the
failure of licensing originates from the inability of the parties to the licensing relationship
to write a complete contract.
To formalize the idea, I assume that there are two types of technology that can be
licensed: the core and the peripheral technologies.   The core technology differs from the
peripheral technology in two respects.  First, the core technology is superior to the
peripheral in that it enables the licensee to produce at a lower cost; the production cost
with the core technology is m while the production cost with the peripheral technology is
                                                          
13Licensing to other firms operating in the same market invites tough competition and lowers the industry's
profit.  Katz and Shapiro (1985) analyzes the conditions under which licensing increases the industry's
profit and, therefore, licensing occurs between firms in the same market.
14In contrast, in Aghion and Bolton (1992) and Aghion and Tirole (1994), ex ante bargaining power
influences the size of the total profits as well as the distribution of them due to the cash constraint facing
one of the parties to the contract.10
m , where m < m .  In addition, the transfer of core technology may enable the licensee to
develop a future generation of related product and may create a competitor to the licensor
in the future.15
To determine which type of technology will be transferred in the licensing
relationship, it is necessary to describe the nature of future competition.  To accommodate
the possibility of future competition, consider a two period model (see Figure 1).
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Figure 1. Timing of the Licensing and R&D Competition.
Once there is a transfer of the core technology, there will be a race to be the first
one to develop a new generation of the product which will render the old product
obsolete.  The new product is assumed to be sold in the second period.  The R&D
competition occurs in the intervening period between the end of the first period and the
beginning of the second period.  The value of winning the race is V.  The loser gets
                                                          
15As a patentability requirement, U.S. patent law (Section 112 of the patent code) mandates the disclosure
of information that would enable “any person skilled in the art … to make and use the same…”  I assume
that  the public information disclosed by the patent grant applies to the peripheral technology and private
information, which is not codified and thus not patentable, is necessary to work the superior technology.11
nothing.16  The first one to develop captures the whole value because further entry is
blocked by the patent.  Alternatively, the assumption of Bertrand competition and a small
sunk cost of entry will ensure no further entry.
I assume that the transfer of the core technology endows the licensee with the
ability to win in the future competition with probability θ .   I can interpret θ  as a
parameter for the licensee’s ability to absorb the technology (see Cohen and Levinthal
[1989]). With the transfer of peripheral technology, the licensee cannot succeed in the
development of the new technology regardless of its ability level.
Let S
CORE φ  and  B
CORE φ  denote the expected future (second period) payoffs for the
licensor (seller) and the licensee (buyer) when the core technology is transferred.17  Then,
abstracting away from discounting and R&D costs, we have18:
S
CORE φ  = (1- θ )V,   B
CORE φ   = θ V( 1 )
In contrast, with the transfer of the peripheral technology, the licensor captures the market
with probability one since there is no danger of being preempted by the licensee.
Therefore, the future payoffs when the peripheral technology is transferred are:
S
PERI φ  = V,  B
PERI φ   = 0( 2 )
Let π (c) and q(c) be the (reduced) profit function for the licensee and the
corresponding profit maximizing level of output in the first period, respectively, when the
constant marginal cost is given by c.19 Let me also denote
CORE R (r) and 
PERI R  (r) as the
royalty income for the licensor when the royalty rate is r:20
                                                          
16The payoff structure of "the-winner-takes-all" is not necessary for  my argument.  All I need is that  the
winner's payoff is larger than that of the loser and the game exhibits the feature of a race.  If the payoff
structure is reversed and the game is one of waiting, there is no need to worry about the transfer of the core
technology.
17Subscripts S and B denote the licensor (seller) and the licensee (buyer), respectively.
18This assumption is not crucial and is made only for expositional simplicity.  We can easily construct a
full-fledged R&D model that accounts for R&D cost and discounting without affecting any qualitative
results that follow.  See Choi (1997) for an interpretation of θ  as the outcome of dynamic R&D competition
between the licensor and the licensee.
19That is, q(c) = argmax [P(q)q - cq] and satisfies the first-order condition P'q + P = c, when P(.) is the
inverse demand function.  Note that by the envelope theorem, π '(c) = -q(c).   
20It should be mentioned that the exclusive focus on the linear royalty payment scheme in this paper does
not entail any loss of generality because any outcome induced by a nonlinear scheme can be replicated by a12
CORE R (r) = r q(m+ r), 
PERI R  (r) = r q(m + r)  (3)
II.1. Licensing under Complete Contracting
Now suppose that a complete contract can be written specifying which type of
technology will be transferred.  If the core technology is transferred with the royalty rate
of r, the payoffs for the licensor, excluding fixed fee component, are  S
CORE φ +
CORE R (r)  =
(1- θ )V + r q(m+ r).  In addition, the licensor can extract the licensee's payoffs from the
technology transfer in the form of a fixed fee, which is given by:
 
CORE F = π (m+ r) + θ V( 4 )
Therefore, the licensor's payoffs with the transfer of the core technology are:
CORE Π () θ = 
CORE R (r) + 
CORE F  + S
CORE φ
                    = r q(m+ r) + [π (m+ r) + θ V] + (1- θ )V
     = r q(m+ r) + π (m+ r) + V
CORE
Π  will be maximized when royalty rate, r, is set at zero since by using the envelope
theorem, we have d[r q(m+ r) + π (m+ r)]/dr = r q'(m+ r) <0.  Since any efficiency gain
by the licensee can be extracted by a fixed fee, there is no reason to distort the licensee's
effective MC by introducing a royalty rate.  Therefore, the payoff for the licensor when
the core technology is transferred is given by:
CORE Π () θ = π (m) + V (5)
                                                                                                                                                                            
linear one.  Consider the second-best contract with a general royalty payment of R(q).  (I considered only
the case where R(q) =rq in the paper.)  Let  ~ q be the output induced by this scheme.  Then, it can be easily
verified, by comparing the first-order conditions, that the same outcome with R(q) can be achieved using a
linear scheme with the royalty rate of r = R'(~ q ) accompanied by an appropriate adjustment of the fixed fee.
This observation has also been made by Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine (1995) and Romano (1994).  The
reader may suspect whether the ICC constraint could be satisfied without the use of distortionary per unit
royalties.  For example, consider the following contract: A fixed fee is charged up front, where the fixed fee
is equal to the monopoly profit of the peripheral technology, π (m ).  If more than the monopoly output for
the peripheral technology, q(m ) is observed, then the licensee would pay a second fee equal to the
difference between the monopoly profits of the core and peripheral technologies, π (m) - π (m ).  However,
this contract is not incentive compatible.  The reason is that when the licensor transfers the core technology,
the licensee will prefer to supply q(m ) with the unit cost of mand have the profit of (m -m)q(m ), rather
than supply q(m) and pay the additional payment, which will leave the licensee’s profit at zero.13
Note that 
CORE Π () θ  is independent of θ .  The reason is that any loss of competitive
advantage by the licensor will be exactly offset by the corresponding increase in the fixed
fee.
Similarly, I can derive the payoffs for the licensor when the peripheral technology
is transferred.   The payoff for the licensee, which can be extracted as a fixed fee, is:
PERI F  = π (m )  +  B
PERI φ  = π (m )( 6 )
In this case also, the royalty rate will be set at zero for the same reason.  Therefore, the
payoff from transferring the peripheral technology is given by:
PERI Π () θ  = 
PERI R  (0) + 
PERI F   +  S
PERI φ
                 = π (m ) + V (7)
Since π (m) > π (m ), the licensor will always prefer to transfer the core
technology.  This vindicates my claim that the possibility of losing future competition
alone cannot explain the nonoccurrence of technology transfer in the core technology as
future competition from the licensee becomes more formidable.  The intuition is quite
simple.  Since the licensor can extract all the surplus from the licensee via a fixed fee, the
first-best outcome is achieved by maximizing the available pie in the relationship, which
stipulates that the most efficient technology be transferred at the royalty rate of zero.
Proposition 1.  With a complete contract, the core technology will always be transferred
in return for a lump-sum payment, regardless of the consideration of future competition.
  Proposition 1 is nothing but an extension of the Coase theorem in that royalties
are distortionary and the transfer of inferior technology involves production inefficiency.
Proposition 1 thus suggests that the failure to transfer the core technology is a result of the
inability of the concerned parties to write a complete contract in conjunction with the
possibility of competition in the innovation market.21
                                                          
21Caves et al. (1983) also note --but do not elaborate the point --that “[t]he very use of a royalty rate in
technology licenses itself indicates a market imperfection in those cases where the licensee sells
monopolistically in a different market from the licensor.”14
II.2. Licensing under Incomplete Contracting
 More specifically, assume that the license contract cannot specify which types of
technology will be transferred.  Even though which elements of the technology constitute
the core component may be well-understood by the parties to the relationship, they may
be difficult to convey to a third party.  One way to interpret this situation is that the
amount of public information disclosed in the licensor’s patent application constitutes the
peripheral technology.22 Licensing allows the use of this knowledge without infringing
the licensor’s patent, which is enforceable in court.  However, the licensor possesses more
knowledge than disclosed in the patent, which cannot be readily defined, patentable, and
priced in the contract.  The core technology contains this component.  Consequently, what
type of technology was actually transferred may not be easily verifiable in court.  In this
case, for the core technology to be transferred, the contract should be incentive
compatible.  The following incentive compatibility constraint must hold for the licensee
to believe that, after paying the fixed fee, the licensor will transfer the core technology:
CORE R (r) +  S
CORE φ   ≥  
PERI R  (r) +  S
PERI φ , or
CORE R (r) - 
PERI R  (r) = r[q(m+ r) - q(m + r)] ≥  θ V =  S
PERI φ  -  S
CORE φ (8)
In other words, the increase in royalty income by transferring the core technology should
be sufficiently large to overcome the decrease in the profit due to future competition.
Note that if there is no future consideration due to the transfer of the core technology (i.e.,
S
PERI φ  -  S
CORE φ = 0), the incompleteness of the contract does not cause any inefficiencies.
Specifying any arbitrarily small royalty rate will make the transfer of the core technology
to be incentive compatible.  In other words, the possibility of future competition is a
necessary condition for the failure of transferring the core technology to occur even
though it alone cannot be a sufficient condition, as we have seen above in Proposition 1.
                                                          
22Indeed, one reason to grant patent protection is to accelerate aggregate innovations by inducing disclosure
of inventions.  Naturally, firms applying for patents try to minimize the amount of information disclosure to
other rival firms.  For an analysis of the relationship between the patent law and information disclosure, see
Scotchmer (1991).15
The effect of the royalty rate on the gap in royalty incomes between the core and
the peripheral technologies can be derived as:
d[
CORE R (r) - 
PERI R  (r)]/dr = [q(m+ r) - q(m + r)] + r[q'(m+ r) - q'(m + r)] (9)
When (9) is evaluated at r=0, it is positive; the gap in royalty incomes increases at least
initially as the royalty rate becomes positive.  To avoid unnecessary complications, let me
assume that sup[
CORE R (r) - 
PERI R  (r)] > V.23  This ensures that there exists a royalty rate r
that can satisfy the ICC for all θ∈[0,1].    Let r*(θ ) be the minimum royalty rate that
satisfies the ICC.  Note that the existence of a royalty rate that satisfies the ICC does not
necessarily imply that the core technology will be transferred.  The reason is that r*(θ ) is
increasing in θ,  reflecting the fact that the ICC becomes more costly to satisfy as the
possibility of leapfrogging increases ( S
PERI φ  -  S
CORE φ = θ V).  If the ICC is too costly to
satisfy, the licensor may opt to transfer the peripheral technology.
When the core technology is transferred with royalty rate r*(θ ), the licensor
extracts the payoff for the licensee via a fixed fee which is given by π [m+ r*(θ )] +  B
CORE φ :
CORE F  = π [m+ r*(θ )] +  B
CORE φ   = π [m+ r*(θ )] + θ V (10)
Therefore, given the probability of losing the future competition θ , the payoff for the
licensor from transferring the core technology can be written as:
CORE Π () θ  =
CORE R (r) +
CORE F  +  S
CORE φ
      = r*(θ )q[m+ r*(θ )] + π [m+ r*(θ )] + V (11)
When the peripheral technology is transferred, the payoff is the same as in the complete
contract case since there is no additional incentive constraint to be satisfied.
PERI Π () θ  = 
PERI R  (0) + 
PERI F  +  S
PERI φ   = π (m ) + V (12)






 =  r*(θ )q'[m+ r*(θ )] r*'(θ ) <0 (13)
                                                          
23This assumption is made purely to simplify exposition and is not necessary.  If this assumption is violated,
there is a critical value θ  where  sup[
CORE R (r) - 
PERI R  (r)] =θ V.  Then, the incentive compatibility
constraint can be met for all θ  ≤ θ .  All the analysis that follows, then, can be applied to this restricted
region.16
Since 
PERI Π () θ  is constant and independent of θ , there is a unique θ * such that
CORE Π () θ >
PERI Π () θ  if and only if θ  <θ *.  If no such θ * exists, set θ * =1.
This result can explain why the transfer of the core technology will decrease as the
capability of the licensee to develop a new product increases.  It can also be shown that,
given the ability of the licensee θ,  the ICC is more difficult to satisfy as V becomes larger.
This implies that as the value of winning future competition becomes more important, the
core technology will be transferred less often.   These predictions are consistent with the
protectionist arguments that advocate safeguarding the cutting-edge technology.24
However, it is important to understand why transferring the core technology
becomes less attractive for the licensor as the probability of leapfrogging and the value of
future competition get larger.   A simple explanation that the licensor gets more cautious
in safeguarding her frontier technology to maintain her dominant position begs the
question of why the expected loss of the licensor cannot be compensated via a fixed fee if
the licensee's competitive gains come at the expense of the licensor.  Indeed, in
Proposition 1, I demonstrated that any loss of competitive edge that accompanies the
transfer of the core technology can be compensated via a fixed fee.25  In my model, the
reason lies in the cost of satisfying the ex post ICC due to the inability to write a complete
contract.
My model can also shed some light on the mechanism by which a "grant-back"
clause can facilitate the transfer of the core technology; it relaxes the ICC.  To analyze the
effect of the grant-back clause on the incentive to transfer the core technology, let me
assume that V comprises two components, VB and VS (V=VB + VS).   VB and VS denote
the values of the new product in the licensee's and licensor's local markets, respectively.
The grant-back clause stipulates that any improvements derived from the licensed
                                                          
24 Another testable prediction of the model is that grant-backs will be observed only with royalty payments.
I am grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing out this.
25 According to my model, therefore, it is not a mistake for the licensor to transfer the core technology even
when she loses future competition to the licensee to whom her core technology has been transferred.  It
could have been a calculated risk taken by a rational decision-maker if the potential loss was compensated
at the license contracting stage.17
technology by the licensee be assigned to the licensor.26  However, they may be used by
the licensee without any additional licensee fee or royalty (Areeda [1981]).  In such an
event, the licensor and licensee will capture their own local markets if we assume a
Bertrand type competition and a small sunk cost of entry into the other's market.
Therefore, with the inclusion of the "grant-back" clause in the licensing contract, the
future payoffs from transferring the core technology are27:
S
CORE ~ φ  = (1- θ )V + θ VS , 
B
CORE ~ φ   = θ VB (1a)
The future payoff from the peripheral technology is the same as before (
S
PERI ~ φ = S
PERI φ =V,
B
PERI ~ φ  = B
PERI φ   = 0)  because the grant-back clause has no consequences in this case.
The ICC for the licensor to transfer the core technology can be rewritten as:
CORE R (r) + 
S
CORE ~ φ   ≥  
PERI R  (r) + 
S
PERI ~ φ , or
CORE R (r) - 
PERI R  (r) = r[q(m+ r) - q(m + r)] ≥  θ VB = 
S
PERI ~ φ  - 
S
CORE ~ φ (8a)
Let ~ r *(θ ) be the minimum royalty rate to satisfy the ICC given the probability of losing
future competition θ.   Since the incentive compatibility has been relaxed with the grant-
back clause (VB < V), we have ~ r *(θ ) <r*(θ ). The payoff from transferring the core
technology can be written as:
CORE ~ () Π θ  = π [m+ ~ r *(θ )] +~ r *(θ )q[m+ ~ r *(θ )] + V (11a)
The payoff from transferring the peripheral technology is the same as before:
    
PERI ~ () Π θ  =
PERI Π () θ  = π (m ) + V (12a)
Let 
~ θ *  be the unique value such that 
CORE ~ () Π θ   >
PERI ~ () Π θ  if and only if θ  <
~ θ *.   The
fact that ~ r *(θ ) <r*(θ ) implies that 
~ θ *> θ *.  Consequently, grant-back clauses can be
beneficial for the licensor in two respects.   First, the grant-back clause allows the core
technology to be transferred for a wider range of parameters.   For parameter values θ ∈
(θ *, 
~ θ *], the core technology will not be transferred without the grant-back clause.
Second, for θ <θ *, the grant-back clause is not necessary for the core technology to be
                                                          
26 For the execution of the grantback clause, the new innovation is assumed to be sufficiently distinct that
all can agree on what constitutes the new technology.
27Variables corresponding to the case with a grant-back clause are denoted with tilde.18
transferred.  The grantback clause, however, reduces the royalty rate and induces a more
efficient output level (see Figure 2).
Proposition 2.  Inclusion of a royalty rate is necessary for the transfer of the core
technology to be ex post  incentive-compatible if the type of technology to be transferred
cannot be specified in the contract.  As the value of winning future competition becomes
more important, the incentive compatibility constraint becomes more costly to satisfy.  As
a result, the transfer of core technology is observed less often.  Grantback clauses allow
the core technology to be transferred in a wider parameter space by relaxing the ICC.
                                                                   
CORE ~ () Π θ
PERI Π () θ =
PERI ~ () Π θ
                                                                                          
CORE Π () θ
                                                      θ *                  θ *                                                    θ
The parameter region in which the inclusion of the grant-back clause is needed for the
core technology to be transferred.
Figure 2.  The Effect of the Grant-Back Clause in the Licensing of the Core Technology19
III. Grant-Back Clauses and R&D Incentives
The basic model in the previous section abstracted from two important
considerations in the analysis of the grant-back clause.   First, the model was devoid of
any strategic R&D competition in that innovation was implicitly assumed to occur by
chance.  Therefore, the only effect of the grant-back clause was an indirect one; grant-
back clauses relax the ICC, which in turn affects the current production decision through
the royalty rate.  If I introduce R&D costs which vary with the intensity level, the
inclusion of the grant-back clause may have the direct effect of dulling the incentive for
the licensee to engage in R&D.   This reduction in R&D incentives for the licensee raised
antitrust concerns that grantback clause may adversely affect competition by limiting
rivalry in innovation markets (see, for instance, U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust
Guidelines for the Licensing and Acquisition of Intellectual Property, 1994).  In this
section, I examine the validity of this concern on the anti-competitive effects of grantback
clauses.
A. Licensee’s R&D Incentives with Grantback Clauses
As in the previous section, I consider a two-period model in which each firm has a
chance to conduct R&D at the end of the first period.  Both firms simultaneously decide
whether or not they will pursue R&D.  The value of R&D for each firm, which depends
on whether the grant-back clause is in place, is known to both firms.  The cost of R&D is
randomly realized and depends on the technological capability of the firm.  If a firm holds
the core technology, the cost of developing a new generation of product is distributed
according to G.   If a firm has the backwards technology, it is assumed that the firm does
not possess the ability to develop a new product.28
Each firm’s optimal R&D policy is characterized by a cut-off point in R&D costs.
In this framework, there is a positive probability that both firms innovate, and thus the
                                                          
28We can generalize the model by assuming that  if the firm holds the peripheral technology, the cost is
distributed according to F, which is assumed to be first-order stochastically dominated, that is, F(x)< G(x).20
payoff structure needs to be specified when both firms innovate.  I shall assume that each
firm becomes a monopolist in its own market with the payoffs of VS and VB for the
licensor and the licensee, respectively.  It transpires that nothing of analytical substance
depends on this particular assumption.  For instance, I can also assume that the winner is
determined randomly with an equal probability in the case of multiple innovators.
Let me first analyze the licensee’s incentive to engage in R&D.  Suppose that the
licensor’s probability of developing a new product is given by σ .  Without a grantback
clause, the licensee’s expected payoff from engaging in R&D is given by σ VB + (1-σ ) V -
c = VB + (1-σ ) VS - c,  while its expected payoff is zero without R&D.  Thus, R&D is
undertaken by the licensee if and only if
c ≤  c
B*= VB + (1-σ ) VS (14)
With a grantback clause, the licensee yields the right to use the licensee’s
innovation in the licensor’s market.  Therefore, the expected payoff of R&D is VB - c.
Thus, R&D is undertaken if and only if
c < ~ * cB  = VB. (15)
Note that the licensee’s cutoff level of R&D costs under the grantback clause (~ * cB ) is
independent of the R&D behavior of the licensor and is unambiguously lower than the
cutoff level without a grantback clause (c
B*), implying that the licensee has less
incentive to engage in R&D.   This result, thus, confirms the validity of the concern that
grantback clauses can reduce the licensee’s incentive to engage in R&D.
B. The Welfare Implications of the Grantback Clauses
The welfare implications of the grantback clauses are not necessarily anti-
competitive due to the licensee’s reduced R&D incentives for the following reasons:
Enhanced R&D Capability with Grantback Clauses
Grantback clauses can enhance the efficacy of the licensee’s R&D spending by
transferring a more advanced technology.   If the prohibition of the grant-back clause21
results in the licensing of the backward technology instead of the advanced technology,
grantback clauses can eliminate wasteful and inefficient research expenditures.  This
point is clearly manifested in my model because no innovation can be forthcoming from
the licensee with the peripheral technology; less R&D is better than no R&D at all.29
Licensor’s R&D Incentives
When the licensor and the licensee are engaged in strategic R&D competition, the
licensor’s response to the licensee’s reduced R&D incentives should be taken into
account.   In particular, it is possible that licensor may increase her own R&D efforts in
response to the reduced R&D efforts of the licensee.  This is especially true, if the nature
of R&D competition is such that R&D decisions are strategic substitutes (Bulow,
Geanokopolis, and Klemperer, 1986).  To see this possibility, let me first analyze the
licensor’s incentive to engage in R&D.  Suppose that the licensee’s probability of
developing a new product is given by β .  Without a grantback clause, the licenses
expected payoff from engaging in R&D is given by β VS + (1-β ) V - c while its expected
payoff is zero without R&D.  Therefore, R&D is undertaken by the licensor if and only if
c < cS * = β VS + (1-β ) V (16)
With a grantback clause, let the licensee’s probability of developing a new product
be given by 
~
β .  With a grantback clause, the licensor gets the expected payoff of 
~
β VS
even without her own R&D.  When the licensor engages in R&D, its expected payoff is
given by 
~
β VS + (1-
~
β ) V - c. Thus, R&D is undertaken by the licensor if and only if
c ≤  ~ * cS  = (1-
~
β ) V (17)
A comparison of conditions (16) and (17) indicates that the licensor’s R&D incentives are
altered with the grantback clauses in two ways.  First, if the R&D incentives for the
licensee are the same, that is β =
~
β , the licensor will reduce its R&D because it now can
appropriate partial benefits of the licensee’s R&D outcome.  However, we know that the
                                                          
29Even if innovation is possible with the peripheral technology, the effective level of R&D may be still
higher with grantback clauses as long as I retain the assumption that further innovation is facilitated with the
transfer of the core technology.22
licensee’s R&D is reduced as a result of the grantback clause (i.e., 
~
β  = G(~ * cB ) < G(c
B*)
=β ), which induces the licensor to increase her own R&D in response.   The direction of
the overall effect of the grantback clause on the licensor’s R&D incentives will thus
depend on the relative magnitude of these two opposing effects.
Preemptive R&D with Parallel Research
The licensee’s reduced R&D incentives may be beneficial if unbridled R&D
competition between the licensor and the licensee tends to be excessive and rent-
dissipating.  It is well-known in the literature that the winner-takes-all payoff structure of
the R&D game often implies excessive rent dissipation.   In this case, restrained
competition with grantback clauses may also be socially beneficial.
C. The Analysis of a Specific Model
To further analyze the welfare implications of the grantback clause and identify
the conditions for which the grantback clause may be welfare improving or reducing, let
me assume a specific form of cost distribution.
Let the cost of R&D be distributed uniformly between [0, nV] if the firm has the
core technology, where n≥ 1, i.e., G(x) = x/nV, x ∈  [0, nV].  I can interpret n as a
parameter indicating the difficulty of the R&D project.   Let me further assume that the
licensor and the licensee have the same market size, namely, VS= VB = V/2.
With Grantback Clauses
We know that the licensee’s critical value of R&D cost is  ~ * cB  = VB = V/2 (see
Eq. (14)).  Therefore, the probability that the licensee will develop a new product is given
by 
~
β  * = G(~ * cB ) = 1/2n.  Given this, the licensor’s critical value is given by ~ * cS  = (1-
~
β ) V = (1- 
1
2n
)V.    The probability that the licensor will engage in R&D is given by







.  The expected welfare from the R&D game between the licensor
and licensee is:23
~ W
CORE = [1- (1-
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Without grantback clauses, I consider two possible scenarios, depending on which
type of technology is transferred, in light of the results in the previous section.
Case 1.  The Transfer of the Peripheral Technology
In this case, the licensee firm has no capability to develop the new product, that is,
β *= 0.   The licensor’s R&D incentives are characterized by cS * = V with σ *= 1/n.  The
expected social welfare in this case is:
W






V (< ~ W
CORE) (19)
Thus, if the consequence of excluding grantback clauses is the transfer of the peripheral
technology, the welfare from R&D is unambiguously reduced without grantback clauses.
Case 2. The Transfer of the Core Technology
Suppose that the core technology is still transferred without a grantback clause.  In
this case, both firms are symmetrically situated without the grantback clause.  I will focus
on the symmetric equilibrium in the R&D game. Let cS *= cB * = c* be the common
critical value for the licensor and licensee in their decision on R&D.   Let µ * be the
corresponding probability of developing the new product for each firm, that is µ *  = β *=
σ *= G(c*).
To derive the symmetric equilibrium, let σ  be the licensor’s probability of





V) + (1-σ )V = cB
Therefore, the probability for the licensee to develop the new product is given by24
β  = G(cB) = G[σ (
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At the symmetric equilibrium, σ * =β *.
Thus, I have
µ * = σ * = β *= 
2
21 n +






The expected welfare from the R&D game is given by:
W
CORE = [1- (1- µ *)












CORE and  ~ W
CORE   indicates that  ~ W
CORE ≥  W
CORE  if and only if n ≤  n≈
2.5195.   Since n is a parameter for the difficulty of the research project, the result has a
natural interpretation.  When the innovation is more or less certain (for a small n), the
beneficial effect of diversified research is rather small and is outweighed by the cost of
duplication and excessive R&D.  Thus, the reduced R&D with a grantback clause can be
beneficial.  However, when the R&D is difficult, the beneficial effect of diversification
through parallel research is more important.
Proposition 3.  (1)If the grantback clause induces the transfer of the core technology, the
inclusion of a grantback clause increases the industry rent from R&D.  (2)If the core
technology is transferred irrespective of the inclusion of the grant-back clause, the effect
of the grantback clause on the industry rent can be either positive or negative.  If n is
small (n ≤  n), that is R&D tends to be duplicative, the effect of the grantback clause is
positive because it can mitigate excessive R&D. Otherwise, the effect is negative because
the benefit of diversification outweighs the cost of duplication.
IV. The Optimal Contract with R&D Competition
If the contract cannot specify the type of technology transferred, there are two25
considerations in the design of the optimal contact.  First, as Proposition 3 in the previous
section informs us, whether or not the contract will actually include a grantback clause
will depend on, inter alia, the difficulty of the project parameterized by n.  Second, the
cost of satisfying the incentive constraint should also be taken into account in the choice
of optimal contract.
More specifically, we already know that the expected value for the licensor when
she transfers the peripheral technology is given by:
S





When the core technology is transferred, the expected value for the licensor depends on
whether or not a grant back clause is included in the contract.  Without a grantback
clause, the two firms are in a symmetric position and share the industry rent equally.
Thus, the expected value of R&D game for the licensor is given by:
S











Note that  S
PERI φ  > S
CORE φ .  Thus, for the transfer of the core technology to be incentive
compatible, a royalty rate should be part of the contract:
   
CORE R (r) - 









]V   =  S
PERI φ  -  S
CORE φ   (8)'
I can define r*(n) as the minimal royalty rate that satisfies the above constraint.
In contrast, with the grantback clause the expected value for the licensor is given
by
S
CORE ~ φ = 
~
β  *VS +  ~ σ *(1-
~



















As in section II, if the peripheral technology is transferred, there is no effect of the
grantback clauses on the R&D competition.  Thus, 
S
PERI ~ φ = S
PERI φ .  For the transfer of the
core technology to be incentive compatible with the grantback clause, it is required that:
     
CORE R (r) - 













V   = 
S
PERI ~ φ  - 
S
CORE ~ φ   (8a)'26
Let ~ r *(n) be the minimum royalty that satisfies the constraint (8a)'.   It can be easily
verified that 
S
PERI ~ φ  - 
S
CORE ~ φ  < S
PERI φ  -  S
CORE φ .   This implies that the ICC is less costly to
satisfy with the grantback clause, and thus ~ r *(n) <r*( n); the grantback clause relaxes the
incentive constraint as in Section II.  Moreover, there is a critical value n
IC such that if n ≥
n
IC ≈ 1.707, 
S
PERI ~ φ  - 
S
CORE ~ φ  < 0.  That is, if n ≥  n
IC ,  the ICC is irrelevant and the core
technology can be transferred without any royalty rate.  The intuition is that if n is
sufficiently large, the probability of duplication is small, and it is in the best interest of the
licensor to diversify the opportunity of R&D and reap the partial benefit of the licensor’s
innovation through the grantback clause.
Since the licensor is assumed to have all the bargaining power and a lump sum
payment can be used to extract all the surplus for the licensee, we have
CORE n Π () =  r * (  n)q[c +r*( n)] + π [c +r*( n)] + W
CORE (11)'
CORE
n ~ () Π  = ~ r *(n)q[c + ~ r *( n)] + π [c + ~ r *( n)] + ~ W
CORE (11a)'
PERI n Π ()  = π (c ) + W
PERI (12)'
Comparisons of Eqs. (11)', (11a)', and (12)' give us the following results: First, if n ≥  n
IC,
the core technology will be transferred.  The reason is that when n ≥  n
IC, the ICC is not
binding and ~ r *(n) =0.  As a result, 
CORE
n ~ () Π = π (c ) + ~ W
CORE > π (c ) + W
PERI
=
PERI n Π ( )(see Eq. (19)).  Therefore, the transfer of the core technology with the
grantback clause dominates the transfer of the peripheral technology.   However, if n is
sufficiently small (n << n
IC) it may be too costly to satisfy the ICC, and the licensor may
opt to transfer the peripheral technology.   Second, for the core technology to be
transferred without grantback clause, it is necessary that n >n.  To see this, note that
~ r *(n) <r*( n).  This implies that r*(n)q[c +r*( n)] + π [c +r*( n)] <~ r *(n)q[c + ~ r *( n)] +
π [c + ~ r *( n)] (see Eq. (13)).  Therefore, for 
CORE n Π () > 
CORE
n ~ () Π , it is required that
W
CORE  > ~ W
CORE.  By using the continuity argument, I can state that there exist ~ n (<n
IC ) and
~ ~ n  (>n) such that the transfer of the core technology with a grantback clause is optimal at
least for n ∈  [~ n , ~ ~ n ].27
Proposition 4.  (1)The optimal contract transfers the core technology with the inclusion
of the grantback clause for intermediate values of n (i.e., n ∈  [~ n , ~ ~ n ]).  For n ∈  [~ n , n
IC],
the contract also includes a positive royalty rate.  For n ∈  (n
IC, ~ ~ n ], the contract has only
the lump-sum component.   (2)For  n <~ n , it is possible that only the peripheral
technology is transferred with a lump-sum contract since the cost of the ICC is too high.
(3)For n >~ ~ n , the optimal contract can be the transfer of the core technology without the
grantback clause because the diversification of R&D is more important.  In this case, the
optimal contract includes a positive royalty rate to satisfy the ICC constraint.  A typical
case for the configuration of the optimal contract is shown in Figure 3.
       Peripheral Tech.            Core Technology Transferred       Core Tech. Transferred
          Transferred                   with the Grantback Clause        w/o the Grantback Clause
    n=1       ~ n            n
IC                                 n             ~ ~ n
Figure 3.  The Optimal Contracts with R&D Competition
Up to now, I have analyzed the licensor’s private incentive to include the
grantback clause in the contract.  I compare the private incentives to that of the social
planner’s who can only control the inclusion of the clause; R&D decisions and other
aspects of the contract are left to the firms.  To this purpose, let me define social welfare
as the sum of industry profits and consumer surplus.  Let CS(c) denote consumer surplus
in the licensee market with CS'(c) <0.   Then, the grantback clause is included in the
contract by the licensor if
CORE
n ~ () Π  > max[
CORE n Π () ,
PERI n Π () ]
In contrast, the social surplus is maximized with the grantback clause if
    
CORE
n ~ () Π + CS[m+ ~ r *( n)] > max [
CORE n Π () +  C S [ m+r*( n)],




n ~ () Π -
CORE n Π () ] < [
CORE
n ~ () Π + CS[m+ ~ r *( n)]] - [
CORE n Π () + C S [ m+r*( n)]].
Therefore, when I consider a situation under which the core technology is transferred
irrespective of the inclusion of the grantback clause, the market incentive to include the
grantback clause is less than the social planner’s.   Thus, whenever the grantback clause is
included in the market, it is welfare improving; not only does it increase the industry rent
from the R&D game but it also increases the consumer surplus in the current period by
relaxing the ICC and lowering the effective cost of the licensee.  I conclude that there is
less incentive to include the grantback clause in this case because the positive externality
of lowering the royalty rate on consumer surplus is ignored by the private decision maker,
whereas the impact of the grantback clause on the industry rent is fully accounted for.
The optimal contractual form is the one which generates the maximum industry rent from
the R&D game since any rent created in the R&D game can be extracted by the licensor
by a lump-sum payment.  As a result, the costs from reduced research with the grantback
clause when diversification is valuable disappear in this situation.
However, if I consider the possibility that the peripheral technology is transferred
without the grantback clause, I cannot rule out the case where the core technology is
transferred with the grantback clause in the market, whereas the social welfare would be
maximized when the peripheral technology is transferred.  That is,
CORE
n ~ () Π  > max[
CORE n Π () ,
PERI n Π () ]
     
PERI n Π () +  C S ( m ) > max [
CORE
n ~ () Π + CS[m+ ~ r *( n)],
CORE n Π () +  C S [ m+r*(n)]
The first inequality above says that the licensor’s profit is maximized when the core
technology is transferred with the grantback clause.  The second one, however, states that
the transfer of the peripheral technology maximizes the social welfare.
This case can occur when ~ r *( n) > m - m , making the effective cost of the
licensee higher when the core technology is transferred (m+ ~ r *( n) >m ).   Thus, the
current consumers in the licensee’s market buy at a higher price than when the peripheral
technology is transferred.   In this case, the prohibition of the grantback clause can be29
welfare improving if the peripheral technology is transferred in the market without the
availability of the clause, i.e., 
PERI n Π () >
CORE n Π ( ) ; without the grantback clause, the
cost of satisfying the ICC is too high and the licensor transfers the peripheral technology.
Interestingly enough, in this case, the anti-competitive effect of the grantback clause takes
place through the current product market price rather than through the rivalry in the
innovation market.  In fact, the innovation market rivalry is intensified due to the
grantback clause in this case since the alternative is the transfer of the peripheral
technology.  Thus, if there is any anti-competitive effect of the grantback clause, the
emphasis on its effect on the innovation market may be misplaced.
With a simple model of R&D, I analyzed the incentive to include the grantback
clause in the licensing contract and its impact on the subsequent R&D game.  The
inclusion of the grantback clause and the transfer of the core technology vis-à-vis the
peripheral technology were shown to depend on the tradeoff between duplication and
diversification in the R&D process (parameterized by n) and the cost of satisfying the
ICC.   This general intuition should be robust to changes in the specifics of R&D game.
For instance, even if I analyze the optimal contract in a fully dynamic R&D race that
accounts for the stochastic discovery process and discounting, the same type of results is
expected.   However, for the anti-competitive effect of the grantback clause, the result
should be viewed as tentative.  The crucial assumption in my analysis has been that the
value of innovation for the society is the same as the private value of innovation (V).  If
the innovating firm cannot perfectly price discriminate and thus extract the consumer
surplus resulting from the innovation, the private firms can underestimate the value of the
innovation.  This introduces a wedge between the social surplus and the industry rent.  If
this discrepancy is sufficiently large, it should be taken into account in the welfare
analysis.
V. Antitrust Guidelines and Grant-Back Clauses30
The analysis in the paper has implications for antitrust treatment of grant-back
clauses.  The importance of competition policy for innovation markets is stipulated in the
Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property (1995), jointly issued by
the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission.  In particular, the Guidelines
make a clear distinction between markets for goods and markets for research and
development and recognize the fact that a licensing arrangement may have competitive
effects on innovation that cannot be adequately addressed through the analysis of goods
markets.
The general approach of these two antitrust agencies in the evaluation of
intellectual property licensing arrangements is to adopt the rule of reason principle.  That
is, they analyze the likelihood of the restraint’s anti-competitive effects and, in the case of
their existence, inquire further whether the restraint is “reasonably necessary to achieve
pro-competitive benefits that outweigh those anti-competitive effects.”  The evaluation of
grantback clauses is no exception.30  According to the Guidelines (1995),
Grantbacks can have procompetitive effects, especially if they are nonexclusive.
Such arrangements provide a means for the licensee and the licensor to share risks
and reward the licensor for making possible further innovation based on or
informed by the licensed technology, and both promote innovation in the first
place and promote the subsequent licensing of the results of the innovation.
Grantbacks may adversely affect competition, however, if they substantially
reduce the licensee’s incentives to engage in research and development and
thereby limit rivalry in innovation markets.
In the application of the general principle to grantbacks, the agencies first
determine whether a particular grantback provision is likely to reduce significantly
licensees’ incentives to invest in improving the licensed technology.  If the answer is
affirmative, the agencies will consider the extent to which the grantback provision has
offsetting procompetitive effects, such as increasing the licensors’ incentives to
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per se unlawful.31
disseminate the licensed technology in the first place or otherwise increasing competition
and output in the relevant market.
The analysis of the paper demonstrates ambiguous welfare effects of grantback
clauses and, thus lends theoretical support for the rule of reason treatment of them.  In
applying the rule of reason to grantbacks, the main concern of the Guidelines is the
decrease in R&D investment that can retard the pace of innovation.  My analysis,
however, suggests that the reduced incentive of the licensee is not necessarily to be
condemned.   As in Kitch’s (1977) prospect theory of patent, grantback clauses can serve
as a mechanism for efficient investment if there is excessive competition in the
innovation market (the case of large n in my model).  Thus, the reduced incentives in
R&D need not be an automatic cause for concern.  The evaluation process calls for more
scrutiny on the nature of R&D competition.
The Guidelines are also based on an implicit presumption that the licensing of
superior technologies entails more competition in output markets.   The main
procompetitive effects of a grantback clause are thus believed to derive from the
licensor’s increased incentive to transfer superior technologies.  My analysis reveals that
the relationship is more complex.   First, the model identifies another channel through
which a grantback clause can enhance efficiency; it can reduce the royalty rate and induce
a more efficient output level.   Second, my analysis provides a caution against such a
simple presumption because I find circumstance in which it can be anti-competitive but,
in contrast to conventional wisdom, this inefficiency occurs from reduced output rather
than from a reduced incentive to innovate.
VI. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I analyze the licensing relationship under circumstances in which the
nature of the knowledge to be transferred is not well-defined in that it cannot be specified
exactly in the contract.  I use the incomplete contract approach that accounts for this type
of market imperfection to assess the dynamic effects of licensing on the R&D competition32
in the innovation market.  In particular, I analyze how the optimal contractual form of
licensing should be structured and what the roles of grant-back clauses are when licensing
entails the risk of commissioning a competitor in the innovation market.  The result is a
framework that provides a moral hazard-based explanation for the prevalence of royalty
contracts in the licensing relationship.  This story is complementary to other explanations
for royalty-based licensing contracts such as signaling (Gallini and Wright, 1990),
intertemporal tradeoffs (Contractor, 1981) and risk sharing.  I also evaluate the validity of
the antitrust concern that grantback clauses may adversely affect competition because
they reduce the licensee’s incentive to engage in R&D and thereby limit rivalry in
innovation markets.
Let me conclude by suggesting a few directions for future research.  First, the
framework developed in this paper may be useful in analyzing the issue of technology
licensing and competitiveness in the global economy.  In particular, my model may have
implications for the dynamics in the formulation and implementation of technology policy
for developing countries, which often pursue active government policies aimed at the
creation of indigenous capacity.  In fear of foreign dependency and/or for the purpose of
strengthening the bargaining power of domestic firms, governments often require their
own approval of foreign licensing agreements.  In the approval process, governments
restrict the type of contracts in order to preclude constraints that may be imposed by
foreign nationals on local firms' efforts to develop their own capability.   However, as the
economy matures and threatens to be a competitor to potential licensors, it may even be
necessary to allow foreign suppliers greater control and favorable terms in order to have
any chance of securing continued access to advanced foreign technologies; it may be
counterproductive to insist on restrictive technology policy as the economy matures.  In
this respect, it is illuminating to observe that in the beginning of 1980 Korea abolished all
restrictions imposed on terms and conditions of foreign licensing as it found it
increasingly difficult to obtain state-of-the-art technologies [see Kim and Dahlman33
(1992)].31
In order to focus on the implications of the licensee’s enhanced capability to
innovate for the competition in the innovation market, I assumed that the technology
licensed in the first period becomes obsolete for sure in the next period.  As a result, I
deliberately ignored the “replacement effect” of the payoffs in the current period on the
incentive to innovate, which was the main concern in the innovation literature [see, for
example, Reinganum (1985), Gallini (1984), and Gallini and Winter (1985), etc.].   I also
abstracted from the product market competition by considering licensing relationship
between two firms serving segmented markets.  Thus, absent in my model is the effect of
payoff interdependence that can arise from downstream competition between the licensor
and licensee or among potential licensees [see, for example, Katz and Shapiro (1985),
Kamien and Tauman (1986), Gallini and Winter (1985), etc.].
Finally, I assumed that the first patent does not block the second innovation.
However, in many situations where grant-backs are issued, the subsequent innovation
may infringe the first one.  The ability to block the second technology enables the original
innovator to extract more surplus from the second innovation.  As a result, the original
innovator’s incentive to license her technology (Green and Scotchmer, 1995) would
increase whereas the licensee’s R&D incentive would decrease.   The need for a grant-
back clause thus may be reduced with broader patent protection.  Another possibility not
considered in the paper is a research joint venture by the licensor and licensee in the
development of the second innovation.  To the extent that the profit from the second
innovation can be shared by the participants, research joint ventures can play a similar
role as grant-back clauses and thus facilitate the transfer of the core technology.  In
addition, research joint ventures have the potential to combine complementary assets of
                                                          
31In the  face of increasing reluctance to transfer technology by firms in industrially-advanced countries,
Korean firms also resorted to the strategy of setting up  "antennas"  which serve as technological outposts.
For example, several Korean firms (especially major chaebols) have set up outposts in Silicon Valley to
leapfrog into state-of-the-art technologies by monitoring technological changes and to acquire advanced
semiconductor and computer technologies [see Kim (1993)].34
the licensor and the licensee.  However, research joint ventures are also subject to various
free-rider problems (Choi, 1992).  To incorporate these distinct but complementary
approaches into the framework would be a logical step for future research.35
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